The odd fiscal ‘implicit bargain’ in the Eurozone. A continental view of sovereignty.
‘In the union of the three kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland the world witnesses a great and
irrefragable example of the immeasurable efficacy of free trade between united nations.’
Friedrich List [1841] 1885.
‘...it would be ruinous to have thirty or forty entirely independent economic and currency unions.
Therefore I would encourage customs unions and customs preferences covering groups of
political and geographical units, and also currency unions...’
JMK [1941] 1980.
I.

Introduction

At present, the European customs and currency union finds itself in a transitional period. It has
not yet politically unified in a federal body and nonetheless it has prematurely bound
constituents by ‘hard law’ fiscal limitations mainly by way of the Maastricht Treaty. Evidently, the
current generation of non-mainstream economists are well aware of the fact, and have reflected
at length on the lagging political unification. Almost a decade after his classic critique of the EZ’s
structure (Goodhart 1988), Goodhart, for instance, revisited the topic to reflect on the
transitional situation the union is currently in. ‘[T]he (implicit) bargain in most federal countries is
that the constituent states abide by fiscal rules, while the central federal government provides
the main redistribution and stabilization functions (Goodhart 2007,145).’ Evidently, the
foundational implicit bargain described by Goodhart is today only met halfway in the EZ.
Whatever the size of the centralized budget for the EU, it is completely inadequate to perform
the key fiscal requirements needed by a conglomerate of monetary production economies of the
size and complexity of those adopting the common currency. Large expenditures as a
percentage of total regional GDP are needed for financial stabilization, social stabilization
(redistribution), and, something Goodhart leaves out, structural capital investments --i.e., statebuilding investments (Arrighi 1994). However, peripheral constituents, as well as larger
members with trade deficits, are expected to abide by stringent fiscal limitations that render
them in a way like second class members.
The lack of a centralized EU/EZ federal government with a large budget as a percentage of total
regional GDP, means there is no centralized authority (Big Government1 [Minsky 2008]) in
charge of either counter-cyclical spending (i.e., stabilization of profits and labor markets),
directed spending for redistribution, or state-building expenditures, without all of which even the
most successful credit economies inevitably fail. In the words of Minsky (1993, 14) ‘the
Minsky, discussing the resilience of the US economy since WWII stated ‘[i]f I were to cite the most
important reason for the success in avoiding a deep depression… I would select the deficits induced by
big government.’ (Minsky 1979, 27). Elsewhere, Minsky (1993, 8) stated ‘[b]ig governments, either
automatically or as the result of discretionary policies, were able to run stabilizing deficits which serve to
contain downside instability of aggregate profits and aggregate demand.’
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successful operation of market economies requires positive intervention.’ Naturally, the lack of a
central government in the EZ has thus implied sovereigns have had to continue performing the
cited functions within their boundaries of jurisdiction, though greatly handicapped by ideological
(austerity) fundamentalists at the helm of crisis management institutions in the region. Hence,
paradoxically, those called to enact the ‘main redistribution and stabilization functions’ are
strong armed into ‘abiding by fiscal rules’, hampering the very viability of the currency union.
This means EZ sovereigns are not allowed to exploit all the tools and policies learned by the
over 80 years of macroeconomic management. In other words, they are unable to exploit their
‘big government’ prerogatives to the degree modern credit economies require2, not only to avoid
downside instability of profits and aggregate demand, but also to bolster and create new
markets as potential future outlets for private sector investments (i.e., state-building). As a
result, real adjustments to demand shocks have taken the place of fiscal and monetary buffers
in the wealthiest region of the world, with arguably the most productive industrial sector, taking
back economic policy to pre-Keynesian times. Using fiscal expenditures to stabilize incomes
and in turn the financial sector (in the last instance, income streams validate, or not, financial
liabilities at large), as well as to combat the intrinsic deficiencies of modern market economies
(unemployment and inequality), is not a policy option. Rather, fiscal expenditures are an
apodictic requirement in all modern credit and market economies. Credit economies implode or
in the best of cases, deflate slowly, in the absence of oriented fiscal expenditures as proffered
by Keynes and Post-Keynesians. The inability to use over 80 years of accumulated knowledge
in macroeconomic stabilization and growth policies has led to recurring sovereign debt crisis
and budget conflicts in the region, while eroding the very belief that a true and fully developed
implicit bargain may be possible within the customs and currency union of increasingly
contrasting economic fate for its members.
In view of the above, the issue of sovereignty becomes crucial in the assessment of economic
viability, be it for a nation-state or a regional grouping. To assess the problem of economic
sovereignty within the EZ, the following sections revisit the work of List, that of the modern day
Chartalists, and the international economics of Keynes developed at the end of his life. The
work of these European state-centered economists form a theoretical foundation for a properly
continental european view of the region’s internal struggles in balancing constituent’s political
independence with economic co-dependence and unity. The main tenets of the economic statecentered tradition form the backdrop to the discussion in what follows on the unique transitional
status of the currency and customs union. The belief is that members’ economic sovereignty
must be at the center of discussions regarding the future of the EZ, and that a sovereign state is
at the foundation of a viable macroeconomy.
A useful starting point to understand the notion of economic sovereignty developed in the
present paper comes from Mitchell’s critical diagnosis of the EZ (2015). In describing the
Mitterand government’s reversal of his predecessor’s (Giscard d’Estaing) monetarist policy,
Mitchell states (2015, 81), ‘[Mitterand’s] government set about doing what a sovereign
2

Before macromanagement was officially practiced as such, statecraft involved stabilization of the
currency, managing the nation’s budget, financing large public investment projects (such as railroad
construction), attracting foreign capital, looking after the balance of payments (Von Laue 1963, 8).
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government should do: use fiscal and monetary policy to expand employment, reduce
unemployment, and expand the social wage.’ If in fact these three aspects ultimately determine
whether or not a government is economically sovereign, it would seem that it is rather the
general historical trend toward renouncing state authority over the increasingly disembedded
economy that has largely defined the Post-Bretton Woods international economy (Harvey 2007,
Naomi Klein 2008, Rodrik 2018), engulfing a majority of countries worldwide to a differing
degree, rather than EZ membership itself causing the difficulties for troubled constituents3. To
the extent that the design of the customs and currency union has reflected this larger global
trend, it indeed has undermined economic sovereignty. Nevertheless, at present, in perhaps a
unique case of hegelian ‘cunning of reason’, the fragile common destiny still binding EZ
members together may alternately also provide the economic underpinning for a
regional/continental policy framework. This could take the form of a policy design that would
deviate from the cited dominating trend renouncing state leadership in economic affairs as new
counter trends emerge in the international economic landscape. State leadership, i.e.,
‘socialization of investment’, and state-building capital investments are required to meet the
international challenges to sovereignty in a world of continuous dispute over hegemony (Arrighi
1994, 1999).
Hence, the main issue hovering over Europe becomes once more how to deal with continental
unity in the face of encroaching external forces on its internal affairs (Heiko Maas 2018), and
perhaps even more menacing, that of internal threats from the austerity fundamentalists
expounding, knowingly or not, rentier interests. It is the unresolved nature of how unity will take
shape that is eroding the gamut of possibilities available to European constituents; viz., it is the
lack of a proper solution to its transitional ‘implicit bargain’ that is leading to equivocal policy and
actions. This manifestly equivocal and contradictory policy was highlighted in the differing
approaches to solvency crisis suffered by Italy and Spain, on the one hand, and Greece, on the
other. The former were supported via LTROs in early 2012 to quash bond market incredulity
regarding their state finances, and yet Greece had to suffer under severe pre-Keynesian
austerity policies (Takagi 2016), in essence applying differential standards among constituents.
Our discussion of sovereignty starts with a look at the relevance of Friedrich List’s work to help
frame the discussion of increasing regional integration historically. List’s work revolves around
the strategic unification of Western Europe as an economic bloc to counter the encroachment of
foreign free-trade interests seeking to control the market for high value added goods --i.e.,
manufactures. Section III evaluates chartalist theory’s crucial insights on the importance of
understanding the monetary authorities ancillary role vis-a-vis sovereigns, especially in regards
to sovereign debt management. Without the central bank’s all out support for state debt,
sovereigns cannot perform stabilization and redistribution policies --both of which are
emphasized by chartalists-- as well as state-building expenditures (Arrighi 1994), all of which
form the backbone of economic sovereignty as such. Section IV looks at the role the ECB has
played in trying to keep the currency union afloat by acting as a continental liquidity provider to
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sovereigns despite its absurd self-imposed restrictions supposedly set in place in compliance
with the prohibition to directly fund constituents. Section V stresses the importance of demandside economies of scale that come with continental unity, mainly in choosing its strategy for
crisis management --EU authorities chose to involve the IMF, however not out of need for
outside liquidity4--, as well as in undertaking crucial state-building investments. All state-building
investments are long-gestation projects, in minskian parlance, Ponzi in nature, and can easily
overwhelm the financial capabilities of even the strongest European sovereign. In section VI,
Keynes’s international economics is revisited as an orienting blueprint for how the European
customs and currency union can address the particularity of economic unification among
sovereigns absent political unity.
II. List and the continental tradition of political economy
The master of continental political economy warned almost two hundred years ago that ‘All
examples which history can show are those in which the political union has led the way, and the
commercial union has followed’ (List 2017, 58)5. Certainly, the validity of the premonition rings
prophetic in view of the vast economic difficulties the experimental and somewhat idealistic -utopian, even-- European currency union has experienced as a result of the financial crisis at
the end of the previous decade. However, List’s foreboding is not without a dash of historical
irony. List was the leading theoretical advocate of the German Zollverein, a customs and
currency union established before the German Empire secured the political unity of the
territories. In a way, List’s life’s work refuted his quoted historical axiom.
The reasons behind nations’ pushing forward to join a commercial/currency union6, in spite of a
lagging political union, are found a few pages after his resounding rejection of a premature
economic integration. Their exposition form one of the underlying threads of List’s proposal for a
new though territorially reduced pos-napoleonic Continental System. Namely, 1) that the home
market is invariably more important than foreign markets in regards to strategies of catching up
(emulation) to the leading economic powers, and must be secured as such; and that 2) both a
large population and extensive territory endowed with plenty of natural resources are
requirements for a nation to survive in the context of (British imperial) free market policies7.
The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office report on the EZ crisis (Takagi 2016) clearly states how Spain
and Italy refused to adopt an IMF crisis management package when encouraged to do so by EU
authorities in early 2012. Both countries sovereign debt was under severe stress. Due to their refusal, the
ECB was forced to intervene to calm markets.
5
Immediately before the cited passage, List states ‘Among the provinces and states which are already
politically united, there exists a state of perpetual peace; from this political union originates their
commercial union…’ (2017, 85)
6
The Zollverein had two currencies; the Prussian currency and the Bavarian currency.
7
List (2017, 76) defines ‘free trade’ as ‘the exportation of agricultural products and the importation of
manufactured goods.’ According to List, only agricultural nations still close to subsistence can benefit
from free trade, and naturally, the free trade imperial power itself. Today it may be more correct to think of
free trade as the interests pushing for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights, open
capital accounts, investor-state dispute settlement procedures favorable to foreign investors, and the
harmonization of regulatory standards, skewing the growing international economic integration toward
powerful special interests (Rodrik 2018). Convergence is near impossible under these conditions.
4

4

Absent these conditions, and in light of the overwhelming economic strength of the dominant
Imperial power of the time, Great Britain, smaller nations would need to adhere to unions if they
were to move beyond mere agricultural societies and consequently overcome their state of
economic dependency. ‘Only through alliances with more powerful nations, by partly sacrificing
the advantages of nationality, and by excessive energy, can it [a small nation] maintain with
difficulty its independence’ (List 2017, 75-76). Though List believed the nation (viz., affinities in
culture, history, and language) was the ultimate binding element in full political and economic
unions, circumstances might drive nations mired down in economic dependency toward the
formation of unions, notwithstanding the lack of national unity8.
In contradistinction to List’s continentalist economic thought, today foreign traditions in political
economy emphasizing further reductions in aggregate demand to counter external imbalances
or demand shocks are hardly benefitting European unity. These foreign yet hegemonic
paradigms (ideologies), viz., the neoclassical canon (Reinert 2008), encourage further
entrenchment of industrial incumbents such as Germany into neo-mercantilism disguised as
free trade --using the elimination of tariffs and exchange rates to further strengthen its dominant
trading status. By limiting the fiscal powers at the disposal of sovereigns, internal markets are
not harnessed to their full potential, strengthening dependence on exports irrespective of the
consequences to economic partners. The work of Friedrich List, on the other hand, represents a
European tradition in political economy in support of nation and market building to counter
aggressive free-market interests. The latter tend to prescribe policy that maintain potential
competitors of the dominant nation --pushing for free-trade-- beholden to exporting to those
countries with much larger domestic markets, rather than strengthening their own consumer
markets.
The work of List, on the other hand, was infused by the eagerness to see continental unity as
the way to achieve parity with Great Britain. Developing expanded (regional) internal markets by
furthering an industrial economy was the key strategy in tackling the most pressing issue of the
day --recurrent agricultural surpluses9. Naturally, Europe’s main concern today lies elsewhere.
The European continent is at the forefront of technological know-how in many major industrial
sectors. Rather it is List’s focus on the strategic importance of uniting and taking full advantage
of the expanded continental market that makes his work once again relevant. Especially so in
light of Europe’s recent disdain for its economic unity and co-dependence
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There emerges a dialectic by which sovereignty is achieved by ceding certain national prerogatives with
the intent to form a union with other sovereigns, in order to salvage political-economic independence
threatened by the imperial power --at the time, Great Britain.
9
In the middle of the XIX Century, agricultural products and all other primary products were sold at better
prices to the British than in the domestic market. Therefore, as was usually the case, the landed interests
represented the greatest political obstacle to the industrialization of the German Territories.
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It was precisely this European economic tradition aimed at shielding home markets from British
imperial designs that placed the continent at the forefront of industrial competencies. List’s goal
of creating a continental market as a self-sustaining world-economy (Ramirez Cisneros 2018),
to use modern parlance (Wallerstein 1980), must be salvaged from the collective unconscious
of european political economy10. A ‘Self-sustaining’11 economic region is one that can manage
its macroeconomy by countering the ‘intrinsic deficiencies of capitalism’ (Keynes 1997), at a
minimum by enacting countercyclical fiscal policy in pursuit of full employment. In doing so, the
sovereign nation or region avoids the more severe forms of rentier hegemony, and
consequently the imposed austerity by hardened ideologues that symptomatically act as if the
chastisement of the innocent was an economic virtue (Krugman 2018).

10

In a way, by inspiring the German, the US and the Russian (via Sergei Witte) drives for industrialization
and development, Friedrich List is arguably the most important political economist of the XIX Century.
11
Likewise, self-sustainability is meant to convey the ability of sovereigns to choose the path toward
recovery after an endogenously engendered financial crisis, often times unavoidable but the
consequences of which can be successfully contained and mopped up.

6

Additionally, List’s focus on internal development of productive capacity by bettering
transportation ways (canals, roads, railways) is in a way an important historical antecedent of
Keynesian aggregate demand management (infrastructure investment as a way to further
macroeconomic objectives)12. Keynes’s revolutionary theoretical breakthrough emerged during
the decline of the British Empire. At the time, Great Britain was attempting more so than ever to
foster its domestic market to support the economy. The gaining strength of the Labor Party had
allowed for full employment policies to enter into respectable political dialogue. Moreover, the
financial exhaustion of fighting and funding allied efforts in WWI had so severely impaired
Britain’s external financial standing, that its days as world economic hegemon were, correctly as
it turned out, feared over. For both List and Keynes the issues of demand management and
price stability (both mainly concerned with deflation) were to be addressed chiefly via
statecraft/macroeconomics. The practice of state-centered economic policy was far more
desirable in achieving economic objectives than its alternative, viz., deflation and/or economic
depression. Furthermore, both economists understood that the use of deflationary policies were
ultimately signs of economic dependency that sacrificed new economic output to old wealth.
III. Chartalism: sovereign money and state-building
In his piece on the deficiencies of the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ (Goodhart 2007, 149) --the
‘hard law’ rules that define fiscal behavior in the EZ--, largely a continuation of his classic
critique of the flaws of European currency unification (1998), Goodhart asserts that,
‘... there has usually been an (implicit) contract between the federal and the provincial (subsidiary) layers
of government. On its side the subsidiary (state) government agrees to some fairly stringent (often
federally imposed) constraints on its ability to run deficits. On the other hand the federal government
implicitly (or even explicitly) guarantees the debt of the lower governments, and, partly through automatic
stabilizers and partly directly, offsets adverse asymmetric shocks affecting differing regions by a system
of inter-regional fiscal transfers.’

In essence, by adhering to the fiscal pact, EZ constituents were reinforcing the subsidiarity
imposed on them by currency unification. Nevertheless, oddly, the subsidiarity did not really
imply subordination to a central government or federal state, as would be the case under a
standard implicit bargain, but rather predominantly to a central bank. The traditional role
between state and central bank --namely, the ancillary nature of the central bank-- was turned
on its head. The singling out of this reversal in subsidiarity implied in the above quoted passage,
echoed Goodhart’s prescient critique more than a year before the actual unveiling of the euro.
The main problem with the EZ framework, according to Goodhart, was precisely the impairment
of central governments’ ability to perform their macroeconomic fiscal responsibilities

12

List is also a precursor to the theory of effective demand specifically as regards the deflationary effect
of aggregate savings. ‘[Adam Smith] does not consider that this theory of savings, which in the
merchant’s office is quite correct, if followed by a whole nation must lead to poverty, barbarism,
powerlessness, and decay of national progress. Where everyone saves and economises as much as he
possibly can, no motive can exist for production… the wealth of nations is to be attained in a manner
different to that of the private rentier.’ (List 2017, 94).
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(stabilization of incomes and redistribution), having lost their debt management arm --viz., their
central bank.
Historically, the nation states have been able, in extremis, (whether in the course of war or other --often
self-induced-- crisis), to call upon the assistance of the money-creating institutions, whether the mint via
the debasement of the currency, a Treasury printing press, or the Central Bank… The Euro area will not
be like that.’ (Goodhart 1998, 410)

Since ‘they can no longer, at a pinch, call upon the monetary authority to create money to
finance their domestic national debt’ (Goodhart, 1998, 410), EZ constituents would become
subsidiary agents limited to hard budget constraints with the aggravating element of not having
formed a federal body to fill the void. That is, no collective body existed to take responsibility for
performing counter-cyclical, redistributive, or state-building expenditures. Goodhart’s vatic
diagnostic of the EZ’s Achilles heel, perhaps summarized as the provisional political
arrangement lagging behind the economic one13, can hardly be disputed. Decades later, the first
severe test of the resiliency of what survived from the ‘divorce between the main monetary and
fiscal ties’ (Goodhard 1998, 410) more than validated his augural assessment.
Nonetheless, Goodhart’s prescient critique left out a crucial aspect germane to his argument.
Other chartalists (Wray 1998, 2016; Bell 2001; Forstater 2003) have accentuated how states
require their monetary agencies/authorities to stand by ready to support the sovereign debt
market at all times, and thus not only ‘in extremis’ or ‘at a pinch’, as appears to be Goodhart’s
view. Central banks are continually and invariably called to perform sovereign debt
management with large injections of liquidity, as other chartalists clearly note (Wray 2015)14,
during war and peace, during bouts of deflation and inflation, during times of cyclical
abnormalities and times of stability.
In fact, Goodhart recognizes elsewhere (1988, 9) central banks owe their very existence to the
management of state debt. As modern market economies evolved into ever more complex
financial systems, central banks became indispensable. The funding of state-driven marketbuilding investments in commercial and transportation infrastructure, along with the financing of
defense services, necessitated the existence of central banks. They evolved into a vital publicprivate organization not only for the financing of these first-order necessities, but also crucially
for smoothing credit conditions when such large amounts of capital were summoned.
Thus, more than by the use of fiscal policies, by today’s standards absolutely compulsory, which
are conducive toward both stabilization of incomes and redistribution (fiscal transfers), as
Goodhart identified, sovereignty is also defined by the ability to carry out state-building
13

Economic unification includes customs and currency unification, and thanks to the Target system, a
significant degree of capital market unification as well.
14
Wray (2015) describes the extent to which the Treasury and the Fed must collaborate to guarantee
smooth credit conditions in liquidity markets as payments are made to and made by the Treasury in the
course of their normal business proceedings with the non-government sector. To think that central bank
independence can encroach on the cited proceeding, interrupting the due course of transactions banks
intermediate and fund, shows a lack of understanding regarding how modern monetary systems work.
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investments15. The latter not only create wealth for private citizens –at times more so for the
courtiers surrounding the seat of power than for the broader citizenry–, but also, and more
importantly, support economic activity going forward (List 2017, Hudson 2009). The enactment
of state-building investments calls for a non-profit seeking financial institution to hold and
distribute sovereign debt. By doing so, states can mobilize the real resources aimed at making
social provisioning possible (see section IV), and accordingly credit economies can successfully
be sustained.
For centuries state-building expenditures involved leveraging social hoards (wheat, and later
bullion as well [Hudson 2019]) to create both an elastic means of payment for retail trade, as
well as larger-value promises-to-pay required for wholesale borrowing/lending . Eventually,
these banks with a public purpose16 became the vehicle to ensure that fraud not take over in the
over-leveraging of cash hoards (precious metals and promissory notes endorsed by the top
exchange houses), i.e., that economizing on cash not lead to mad speculative booms. Setting
aside their at times spotty track record –history is replete with examples where state-centered
clearing banks failed in their oversight responsibilities, but also of extended periods of stability
(Roberds and Velde 2016a, 2016b)– without central banks, the monetization of social hoards for
the purpose of government promotion of basic infrastructure for social provisioning would have
been near impossible. For this reason, central banks have always been crucially important
institutions for modern nation-states, and are tasked with continually stabilizing and supporting
the macroeconomy, but also with supporting state-buidling in general, all of which are objectives
well beyond price stability and full employment.
The role of state-building expenditures as a crucial part of sovereign fiscal disbursements is
intimately tied to the history of modern nation-states as such (Arrighi 1996), and thus is also
crucial to the history of the so called banking principle (Keynes 1980, Kregel 2019). Nationstates owe their existence in part to their capacity to mobilize society’s resources by making
their liabilities, via the central bank, both the standard for payments in retail transactions, as well
as the financial instrument par excellence in capital markets. By exploiting their currency
sovereignty (Forstater 2008, Wray 2015), they can undertake projects that are not immediately
profitable, but are nevertheless required for social reproduction. Hence, during times of stability,
it was not uncommon for central banks’ promises to pay to trade at above par with precious
metals (Colwell 1859), in spite of their far greater elasticity of production. No other institution is
15

Our use of the concept of state-building is inspired by the work of G. Arrighi (1994). According to
Arrighi, ‘economic nationalism’ came about in the battle for economic supremacy between British and
French mercantilism. One of the ‘ingredients’ of economic nationalism was ‘domestic economy-making’
that involved both war-making and state-making. The latter implied the build up of a state bureaucracy to
promote private accumulation of wealth that in turn bolstered the strength of the state bureaucracy to
better position itself in the inter-European mercantilist battle. Our concept, on the other hand, emphasizes
on the one hand, the macroeconomic importance of having something like a ‘capital budget’, and on the
other, the benefits of infrastructure development for modern credit economies that seek to maintain their
commercial/trade relevance internationally.
16
Undoubtedly, the non-profit seeking nature of central banks goes a long way toward ensuring a proper
oversight, notwithstanding the persistent criticism from the wider public, economists, and even the
executive branch regarding its performance, power, and purpose (Todd 2012) –criticism, often times well
deserved.
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better placed to apply the banking principle, i.e., to leverage social hoards, than the central
government by way of its Treasury/Exchequer and its subsidiary debt management arm, the
central bank17, precisely because it is the embodiment of the social contract.
The exploitation of the banking principle renders economic discipline for sovereigns qualitatively
different than for private sector agents. For a select group of states, standard solvency criteria
(determining whether it is engaging in hedge, speculative or ponzi finance) do not apply. The
common restrictions on matching income flows and payment outflows that businesses and
households are all beholden to, do/should not apply to these select sovereign governments.
Rather, the shopkeeper mentality of miserly economizing, when adopted by nation-states, leads
sooner rather than later to failed-state status18. States validate their legitimacy and authority
precisely from their fulfillment of fiscal commitments that foster wealth creation and economic
stability. At least one economic agent must be delinked from hard income constraints on
spending so that solvency is made possible for those private entities obliged to match payment
inflows and outflows, and run a surplus in the long-run (Ramirez Cisneros 2018). Naturally, this
agent must be the sovereign having been invested with collective sanction as the bearer of the
social contract. Furthermore, due to purposes altogether beyond the altruistic or patriotic, the
decoupling of the sovereign from hard budget constraints entails the submission of short-term
private oligarchic interests in order to be successful (Hudson 2019). Pushing forward statebuilding projects to strengthen the state involves initiatives far beyond the petty interests of high
finance (Arrighi 1994) and the rentier, normally pushing for balanced budgets out of fear for its
holdings of public debentures becoming non-performing.
Without a doubt, some of the weaker trading nations in the EZ have been constrained in
carrying out their sovereign mandate to both manage the macroeconomy (i.e., stabilization and
redistribution) and to foster new market creation by way of state-building investments19. The odd
implicit bargain currently in place does not allow the exploitation of the sovereign banking
principle to the extent required in order to guarantee full employment and an increasing real
wage --the true testaments to economic sovereignty--, both of which require state-building
investments and thus deep sovereign debt markets.
IV. The need for a militant central bank

“The tendency of a national bank is to increase public and private credit. The former gives power to the
state, for the protection of its rights and interests: and the latter facilitates and extends the operations of
commerce among individuals. Industry is increased, commodities are multiplied, agriculture and
manufacturers flourish: herein consists the true wealth and prosperity of a state.” (Hamilton 2015, 237)
18
“A nation consisting of such insane misers would give up the defence of the nation from fear of the
expenses of war, and would only learn the truth after its property had been sacrificed to foreign
extortion…” (List 2017, 94).
19
The task of economic development is a continually required undertaking. Even high-income countries
must seek to upgrade infrastructure to keep up with competitors and to ensure that neither technology
permanently displaces large sectors of workers, nor the country stagnates in regards to service sector
absorption of those displaced.
17
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The strongly validating ECB stance called for by the acute circumstances of the euro area crisis,
has (partially) enabled peripheral sovereigns to fulfill their fiscal responsibilities stated above, as
required in all modern complex monetary production economies. By far the majority of the
ECB’s Quantitative Easing (Asset Purchase Program and previous large-scale central bank
purchase operations) has gone to purchasing sovereign debt. This may be due to the
particularities of liquidity operations and portfolio preferences of the European banking system
and actors, however, it showed that when tested, the ECB acted abiding by its commitment to
act as the ultimate monetary backstop for sovereigns. Without the financial support from a
monetary entity whose solvency is unquestionable, creating fiscal solvency for sovereigns20,
monetary production economies cannot maintain a semblance of stability; not at the national
level, and much less so at the international level (Minsky 1979, Ramirez Cisneros 2018).
Central banks have provided this support throughout the ages (Colwell 1859). In fact, as stated
above, it is among their primary roles.
Making use of a region-wide, in essence continental, central bank to support and encourage the
political-economic independence of peripheral sovereigns, allowing them to avert the worst of
the pre-keynesian austerity policies –at least in the cases of Italy and Spain–, is thus required to
maintain national sovereignty in all constituent states. Without deference to a degree of financial
sovereignty for even those constituents that pose no realistic systemic risk on account of their
small size, the continuing viability of the currency union is perilously undermined. In the words of
Goodhart (2007, 151), ‘[t]here were few, arguably no, offsetting benefits (carrots) for countries
committing themselves to give up their own abilities to use fiscal policy to mitigate asymmetric
shocks’, and as a result, we might add, the ECB has had to compensate for this lack of
stabilizing mechanisms at a level superseding the individual nation-state. Hence, though the
ECB is providing fiscal space to sovereigns, however reduced it may be, the very continuation
of the EZ warrants the primacy of economic sovereignty over central bank policy independence,
as things stand today21. The primacy of political-economic independence over central bank
independence22 is not a novel reordering of priorities. On the contrary, important historical
antecedents can be found. The agreement between the US Treasury and the Fed to fix long
term rates on government securities during the WWII military buildup (Hetzel and Leach 2001)
and campaign is one in a long list of examples (Wray 2014).

20

In describing the liquidity support the central bank offers banks holding treasury securities, Minsky
mentioned in passing how these liquidity operations entailed an endorsement of public debt. ‘The sale of
Treasury securities was an assured way of acquiring cash because the Federal Reserve was committed
to sustaining the money value of Treasury securities.’ (1993, 5)
21
To the degree it shields the monetary authority from short-term populist interests, central bank
independence is naturally a valuable monetary axiom. However, the monetary authorities should not
override or undermine the long term economic development goals of a sovereign in the name of price
stability.
22

Even in ‘normal’ times central bank’s prerogative to set policy independently of elected officials’ influence is
inordinately geared toward ‘price stability’. Price stability is a cipher for acting in the interest of the rentier class
(financial oligarchy). In a way, class consciousness was born out of the social strife caused by the financial
oligarchy’s refusal to accept debt write downs, as can be seen clearly as far back as two millennia B.C. (Hudson
2019). Debtor class consciousness has existed for millenia.
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Even mainstream sources (Condon 2019) appear to believe the era of central bank
independence has most likely come to an end for the foreseeable future. The multiple rounds of
QE in support of both domestic credit markets and sovereign solvency has largely debased the
belief in central bank operations’ independence (Mitchell and Fazi 2017). This is one of the few
positive aspects resulting from the GFC. The eroding of the periodically unassailable belief in
central bank independence, which waxes and wanes with the changing global (and geopolitical)
realities regarding national(-ist) objectives (Toniolo 2005, Toniolo and Borio 2006), has
translated into expansions of central bank balance sheets to record levels. The trillions of dollars
distributed by the ECB in liquidity support to banks and large portfolio managers, cleansing the
balance sheets harboring non-performing assets, is testimony to the ultimate subsidiarity of
monetary authorities. The purported and until recently desirable autonomy of central banks was
in reality, according to some (Posen 1993), a cipher for independence from democratic control.
Thus it hid the true political nature of monetary institutions –an insight Chartalists have always
understood (Wray 2014). Even for organizations functioning largely according to technical
rationality23 –as opposed to an overt political rationality–, which in itself is disputable as a proper
description of ‘normal’ central bank policy (Goodhart 1988, Borio 2005), the crisis has once
again shown that central banks are shot through with political interests24, and thus never truly
neutral. During times of duress central banks reveal their role as appendices of the
Exchequer/Treasury, confirming that money is largely a creature of the state, or minimally
requires substantial state support to serve its purpose (Wray 2014). Only during times of peace
and stability can the case be made with any legitimacy, and then mainly by the rentier class,
that central banks should act primarily to combat inflationary increases in credit.
The ECB’s active assistance of public sector solvency is key at this early stage of the common
currency endeavor. By maintaining eligibility of sovereign debt as collateral in liquidity
operations25 even during the worst of times, as occurred only belatedly in the US fiscal and
monetary union with the passing of the Glass-Steagall act of 1932 (Burgess 1946, 121),
peripheral sovereigns can recover some of their lost fiscal capabilities. Even internal EU
documents recognize the dangers involved in the loss of fiscal capabilities upon joining the
currency union.
‘States that do not have full control over their central banks can get in a situation, as banks, in which a
liquidity and maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities occur. In such a situation a
phenomenon similar to a “bank run” can happen to a State. In order to avoid such a situation a State

23

Neither in its macro responsibilities of overseeing financial market stability (the promotion of price
stability and full employment), nor in its micro functions of regulating credit providers and looking after the
health of the payments system (Minsky 2008, Goodhart 1988, Kregel 2019) do central banks strictly
function under an instrumental or technical rationality.
24
Without a doubt, the refusal to take over banks after injecting trillions of dollars of liquidity into the
banking system, reflects just how strong some of these interests were.
25
The Glass-Steagal act of 1932 allowed banks to hold government securities as collateral for holdings of
federal reserve notes –in high demand at the time due to the nationwide distrust of most banking
institutions. This measure both secured the banking-system’s solvency and elevated government debt in
the liability pyramid placing it on equal standing with many private sector credit instruments.
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needs a source of unlimited liquidity such as a central bank acting as lender of last resort’ (Repasi 2013,
15).

Liquidity support and sovereign solvency assistance are thus basic prerequisites for a properly
functioning currency union dependent upon unified capital markets (Schelkle 2018).
Until a region-wide fiscal entity emerges, or ‘hard law’ regulations governing members’ fiscal
budgets can be agreed upon that are flexible enough to allow struggling countries to enact
countercyclical fiscal and credit policies, and yet impose a degree of discipline (tied to managing
increasing labor costs in line with a living family wage), there will be little alternative to the
ECB’s making the market for sovereign debt in crisis situations. The more resolutely it
intervenes in support of its members, the less prone they will be to speculative attacks or runs.
Categorically, the greatest moral hazard is that which liberates the oligarchy from the
consequences of their mismanagement of the economy, and not helping member states in need
of assistance.
The main institutional obstacle to ECB support for sovereigns was the limitation on the Public
Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) to capital key ratios for each member of the ECB, along with
the restrictions on holdings both of a particular debt issue, and of total debt outstanding (up to
25% and 33% respectively [Claeys, Leandro and Mandra 2015]). This constraint is bewilderingly
in denial of the asymmetric nature of regional demand shocks. It directly interferes with the
fulfillment of the ECB’s duties, and precipitated the entry of non-European agents, such as the
IMF, into the crisis management process, with its known repertoire of burdensome
conditionalities (Ocampo 2015). Limiting purchases of EZ member’s bonds to proportionality
with the capital key is not part of the statute governing the ECB. Rather, it is a decision of the
ECB dating back to May, 2010 (Eurpean Central Bank 2010) and may be in violation of article
124 of the statute (European Union 2012), that allows central governments access to the ECB
on the basis of prudential considerations .
As stated above, the true nature of the central bank reveals itself during times of severe
financial duress. During such periods, its supposed independence can be seen for the political
illusion/utopia it really is. Both private sector financial assets and banking sector liabilities not
backed by government guarantees cease to hold and convey value, and sovereign solvency is
severely eroded. The definition of a failing sovereign is precisely one that cannot perform
redistribution policies (direct taxation and targeted spending to ameliorate the conditions of the
producers of value), stabilization measures of aggregate demand, and structural (state-building)
investments. Hence, the central bank must support the value of otherwise highly illiquid
sovereign debt so that capital markets do not implode at the first sign of market turbulence26 –
right around the corner in all credit and monetary production economies–, but also in
26

See note 19. Minsky understood that capital markets largely function on the foundation of safe assets
provided by the state and are thus reliant on the central bank as the purveyor of liquidity in exchange for
these assets. Liquidity operations involving the central bank thus both sustain and bolster the banking
system, as well as support the value of public debt. This dual role of liquidity operations is at the root of
the ‘doom loop’ dynamic where bank risk and sovereign risk intertwine.
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accordance with its duties to the entity from which it derives its charter and legitimacy as the
ultimate purveyor of liquidity and currency –i.e., the state.
V. Unification under a continental project
In the best of cases, it is short-sighted to base a monumental endeavor aimed at unifying
regional markets on cutting transactions costs. According to one of Europe’s foremost
proponents of continental unity, Friedrich List, for whom saving on transactions costs –internal
tariffs, at the time– was nevertheless key, the purpose of a customs union was structural
change and ultimately, sovereignty. As stated above, only structural change could lead to
economic independence by securing regional markets as a home base for catching up
industrially.
Without structural change, and facing powerful free-trade interests seeking to take over markets
for their own benefit, ensuring sovereignty would be unthinkable. Thus, a customs and currency
union ultimately serves not only to take advantage of cost reductions in both cross-border
transactions and domestic interest rates, but more importantly to capitalize on economies of
scale, especially on the demand-side, that could more than compensate for the loss in local
domestic control of monetary policy. Exploiting the demand-side scale effects from a customs
and currency single market, with largely unified capital markets, holds the potential to vastly
increase economic sovereignty. Namely, by increasing the size of the European domestic
market, a space for realization is carved out in which ‘internal exports’ (or government deficits
[Kalecki 1954]) can help overcome a major contradiction of market economies –viz., that
production itself rarely creates a sufficient level of demand to consume produced goods–,
gradually eliminating a degree of dependency on international export markets27. In other words,
the possibility of forging a region-wide macroeconomic and full employment28 strategy becomes
a reality.
Additionally, the large and internationally relevant nature of the ECB, covering the single largest
economic union in the world, has the clout, prestige, and virtual limitless liquidity to contain a
systemic financial crisis precisely due to the size and affluence of the market it oversees.
Minsky (1979, 16) citing R. S. Sayers’ classic study on central bank operations, would state ‘[i]t
is the duty of every bank and most of all the central bank to be rich’, denoting how banks’ wealth
was a product of their sustained contractual payment inflows from clients.29 In other words,
27

Pressuring the domestic economy to increase exports is, in a way, a sign of economic dependency.
During the Gold Standard promoting exports was a requirement to bolster market confidence.
28
As stated above, full employment policies are fundamentally a development problem to the extent one
sector absorbs redundant labor force from another, i.e., the manufacturing sector absorbs hidden
unemployment from the countryside, and the service sector absorbs redundant labor from the industrial
sector.
29
Minsky also believed that in normal times banks structure their balance sheet so that the flow of funds
from debtors is relatively constant and low-risk. Furthermore, the axiom was used in support of the real
bills doctrine, that bank credit was only minimally inflationary if and when geared toward hedge and
speculative projects. An investment portfolio mainly comprising the latter projects increases the likelihood
of staying rich, i.e., ensuring a reflux of funds in the bank’s favor at the end of the payment period.
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banks were supposed to be rich because their clients’ projects were lucrative, reflecting due
diligence by bank appraisers. Without a doubt, the EZ is a place where wealth creation can and
does flourish, thus making the ECB, in minskian parlance, a very rich bank despite not being a
profit seeking institution. In essence, the wealth of the continent is the rock bed of the wealth of
the ECB. In addition, Minsky also stressed that central banks not only had the duty of being rich
(on ledgers and financial statements), but of acting rich, viz., injecting large amounts of funds to
backstop a systemic crisis. Hence, the ECB allowed the EU and EZ authorities the prerogative
to decide the course of action it deemed best during the systemic crisis without necessarily
having to submit to external actors, such as the IMF. The decision to make the IMF a part of the
crisis resolution process was a political decision. It was by no means a decision stemming from
a lack of funds.
Therefore, the ECB has shown itself capable of managing financial difficulties by administering
multiple rounds of QE including targeted support for sovereigns. Policy options of such
magnitude, and the sheer disregard for quantitative limitations they imply, would be
unimaginable even for most G-7 nations as history shows. For instance, in 1976, after drawing
heavily on a credit line arranged by the US Treasury and other official lenders organized by the
Bank of International Settlements, the UK was forced to approach the IMF for a loan to pay back
its creditors. The UK, on its own, was unable to counter a run on the pound caused by a myriad
of factors including the international oil crisis, the increasing government deficit and the
deteriorating external balance. At the time, their application for funds was the largest single
application for an IMF loan in history. In contrast, the international standing of the euro is an
order of magnitude above any national European currency. Today, the euro’s global share of
disclosed official currency reserves stands at over 20%, while its share of global trade payments
flows is almost 36%, just shy of the dollar’s 40% share (European Central Bank 2018). The
combined size of the economic union shields members from having to use foreign currency in
neither their official reserves, nor their invoicing of trade. This in turn makes them significantly
less vulnerable to the spread of financial crisis due to depletion of foreign reserves. Additionally
and perhaps more importantly, it effectively shields itself from the more aggressive
manifestations of economic warfare such as economic sanctions, by falling back on its own
financial network to trade and clear payments with trade partners falling out of favor with global
superpowers.
In the post-Keynesian tradition, especially in the work of Minsky, a foundational macroeconomic
tenet is that market economies, in which investment decisions are made by private firms,
regularly experience difficulties, at times quite severe, in the absence of strong non-profit
seeking and public purpose institutions. ‘Capitalism, which is driven by profit seeking activities,
is inherently evolutionary: strong institutions which sometimes bind and constrain and which
other times promote and induce entrepreneurial activity are necessary if capitalism is to be a
viable economic order.’ (Minsky 1993, 15). These institutions30, part of Minksy’s oft cited
‘ceilings and floors’, are designed to counter economic trends potentially leading to severe
30

In the US, institutions such as the FDIC, in charge of providing insurance for depositors, the SEC,
tasked with oversight of securities markets, and, for instance, many of the institutions established in
response to the financial difficulties of the Great Depression.
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dislocation (boom and bust cycles), but can also promote recovery once a crisis takes hold.
Minsky believed these ‘binding and promoting’ institutions and tools were at the root of the
resiliency of the US economy and banking system –resiliency that also buttressed the rest of the
capitalist world (Minsky 1979)– after WWII and came in the form of government deficits,
‘refinancing actions’ by the Treasury, central bank interventions, and regulation of certain ponzilike credit arrangements leading to financial fragility. At the international level, initially the US’s
large aid and capital flows followed by large current account deficits were the major stabilizing
force in the absence of such institutional ceiling and floors at the international level. However,
the select club that had the demand-side economies of scale to enact such policies were very
few. The US, as the largest economy in the world, with the largest consumer market by an order
of magnitude, had the capacity to unleash powerful fiscal and monetary policy instruments
without regard to the effects on its external balance.
Though Minsky never discussed in depth the economic significance of the demand-side
economies of scale --mainly, when the sheer size of the domestic economy is such that access
to its markets define international solvency31-- he undoubtedly comprehended it. Minsky
believed the US’s role as the provider of liquidity and income flows to sustain the international
dollar liability structure was attributable to its successful decoupling of effective demand from
the performance of the current account (Minsky 1983, 1986; Ramirez Cisneros 2018). This
decoupling from the balance of payments constraint provided unparalleled freedom of
maneuverability during a crisis. However, according to Minsky, other core countries, were called
to exploit their demand-side economies of scale to shield to temper hyper-competitive trade
strategies causing damaging financial instability internationally, ‘[t]he United States has provided
an umbrella for the economic growth and stability of Europe and the rest of the capitalist world
in the years since World War II…’, however ‘[i]t seems clear that in any future financial crises
involving international banking, the lender of last resort operations, and the generation of large
scale government deficits, [the enactment of these policies] will have to be shared…’ (Minsky
1979, 28). In other words, the US’s deficit in trade had been the main guarantor of stability in the
international economic arena, but other core nations, especially Western European powers and
Japan, would have to step up to the plate (Ramirez Cisneros 2018). Thus, already as far back
as 40 years ago, Minsky was calling for Europe to do more. Namely, European allies had to
contribute in the generation of income flows (dual deficits, fiscal and trade) for the rest of the
world. The current scale of the currency union gives Europe the capacity to take on its long
awaited responsibility to bolster international economic conditions conducive to worldwide
financial stability and resiliency. As a regional bloc, it could doubtless run dual deficits without
worrying about small economy restraints on their policy actions.
From the perspective of macroeconomics and the fiscal capabilities of the state, continental
unification adds another important capacity. It is the case that most if not all state-building
investments are indeed of a ponzi nature. Not, of course, in the sense of a fraudulent pyramid
scheme –a la Madoff–, but rather to the degree payments to shareholders and creditors occur
well in advance of the first scheduled revenue flows. In Minsky’s words, ‘every long gestation
31

Other demand-side economies of scale include having your currency at the top of the international
currency pyramid, and consequently, having your debt at the top of the international liability pyramid.
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investment scheme is a Ponzi scheme’32. Hence, state-building projects in particular, all of
which are ‘long gestation’ ventures, require large fiscal expenditures that often overwhelm even
G-7 nations’ fiscal faculties. Regional unification is key in enhancing the ability to undertake the
development and modernization projects required by all modern economies, projects the private
sector cannot venture into without substantial effective or shadow underwriting by the
government. By enlarging markets to the point of self-sustainability (List 2017), unification thus
summons the large reservoirs of funding capabilities needed. Long gestation state-building
ventures are not at the disposal of all sovereigns. In fact, the need to establish a World Bank
with a view to help fund basic infrastructure projects for fiscally challenged, i.e.,
underdeveloped, nations illustrates the strain long gestation projects can have on sovereigns.
Furthermore, the scale of the customs and currency union creates new opportunities for
furthering strategic projects to strengthen regional sovereignty beyond fiscal policy. The foreign
minister of Germany recently pointed out ‘“Europe United" means this: We act with sovereignty
at those points where nation-states alone cannot muster the level of power a united Europe can’
(Maas, 2018). Besides collaboration in military projects33,unification has allowed official
promotion of the use of the euro in energy markets (European Commission 2019), as well as
the yet unsuccessful attempt to launch Instex, an alternative to the worldwide payment platform
controlled by the US known as SWIFT. Both projects, pioneered by official European
organizations, have received support in the belief they would further promote much needed
European sovereignty vis-a-vis the US34, till now, the guarantor of economic affairs for the
region –as can be seen still today in the management of Ukrainian affairs.
VI. Limitations of the ‘Keynes Plan’ and its implications for EZ constituents.
For Keynes, the limitations to economic sovereignty weighed heavily on his mind in designing
the Post WWII financial system. For this reason, his main apprehension was whether core
nations’ could endure the difficult transition from war to civilian economies without a relapse into
‘autarky’35. This imbued his analysis and proposals that laid the groundwork for an international
financial system with an expansionary bias (Keynes 1980). Keynes evidently foresaw the
difficulty the United Kingdom would face in regaining its footing as an economic powerhouse
having exhausted itself financially in two World Wars. Additionally, the effects from clause VII of
Lend-Lease (Skidelsky 2000) in essence implied the de facto dissolution of the Sterling Bloc. In
other words, his main concern lay with the sovereignty of a core capitalist industrial and financial
This included, in his view, real estate construction and the financing of plant ‘if the financing of a plant
that takes a long time to build is separated from the finances of the owning corporation (Minsky 1979,
23).’
33
A case in point would be the new European fighter jet project; a typical state-making project and a
boon for private contractors (Brzozowski 2019).
34
‘The outstanding aim of our foreign policy is to build a sovereign, strong Europe. Only by joining forces
with France and other European nations can a balance with the US be achieved.’ (Maas 2018).
35
It would seem that rearmament was one of Keynes’s main concerns for the post-war world. He
designed his international clearinghouse proposal so that levels of world-wide liquidity not hamper
reconstruction by deficit core countries leading to restrictions in trade. This would go a long way in
avoiding some of the more hostile commercial and industrial policies that were common in Europe in the
lead up to the Second World War.
32
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powerhouse (Kregel 2019), Great Britain. As a result of its indebtedness, and the loss of its
imperial territories, Britain would see the strength of its sovereign solvency –and hence its
implicit bargain– significantly undermined.
Keynes’s design of the international clearing union, devised primarily out of patriotic duty,
sought to ensure Britain could rebuild after the war without extending the hardships from a
wartime economy to peacetime (Skidelsky 2000). The system he designed was meant to
eschew austerity as a policy for overcoming heavy debt burdens at the macroeconomic level.
By creating a framework that established clear channels of reflux from creditors to structural
(long-term) debtors, the onus of financial stability was placed on the commercially dominant
nations (Davidson 1985, Kregel 2019). The cited international reflux channels proposed by
Keynes were designed precisely to encourage the pursuit of macroeconomic policies put
forward in the General Theory (Bibow 2017, Ramirez Cisneros 2018). In other words, the
advocated reflux mechanisms offered countries the financial support at the international level
enabling them to focus on elevating national income without great concern for the balance of
payments. In doing so, multilateral commerce would avoid falling prey to hypercompetitive trade
strategies between European powers that had created segmented areas of commercial privilege
for a dominant industrial power (a German area, a British dominated area, a Franco-Benelux
region, etc.). Hence, under an international framework guaranteeing reflux of surpluses,
countries could prioritize domestic economic issues –specifically, for Keynes this meant tackling
inequality and unemployment– without kneeling to hard-currency type international financial
constraints that inevitably lead to systemic breakdown. For Keynes, macroeconomic demand
management was the best way to tackle systemic problems inherent in market economies
(inequality and unemployment) instead of the customary curtailment of consumption and
government expenditures to create the savings to (re-)build an export industry. The Keynes plan
would have led the way for an unparalleled degree of economic sovereignty for nation-states.
Keynes’s envisioned international financial system gave a select group of nation-states room for
maneuverability to focus on domestic economic programs based on a ‘practical best’ for market
systems (Minsky 1993) –namely, functioning at an approximation to full employment. Pointedly,
during the Gold Standard, countries were unable to pursue macroeconomic policies that brought
a certain level of control over the often times painful fluctuating conditions of the economy36. To
hold the exchange rate within the margin of gold points, both private consumption and public
expenditures had to be held in check so that domestic prices and imports not adversely affect
the external balance. Precisely, herein laid Keynes’s abhorrence of the Gold Standard –
throughout the period, adjustment meant deflation. In a word, Keynes viewed the Gold Standard
as an obstacle to economic sovereignty understood as the capacity of states to counter the
inherent faults of monetary accumulation in capitalist systems, in which accumulation of money
balances (or reserves) introduced a deflationary bias into the economy. Therefore, his designed
international financial framework sought to bolster sovereignty by encouraging collaborative
multilateralism. As a result, nation-states could use directed expenditures to mitigate inherent
flaws in the system, like hoarding, instead of the default curtailment of consumption and public
36

The traditional form of the trilemma taught in textbooks suggests mainly monetary policy was constrained under
fixed exchange rates. In fact, fiscal policy was equally limited if not more so, much as it is in the EZ today.
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investment. His proposal for an international clearing union also envisioned the economic
hegemon leading by example, i.e., spending its way out of crisis, and in doing so, overriding
traditional concerns regarding sovereign solvency.
Hence the encouragement by Mitchell and Fazi for constituents to re-adopt their national
currency as a measure to regain some of the sovereignty lost to the EZ supra-national
institutions does not consider that outside the common currency, it is doubtful a collaborative
multilateralism exists today37. The most likely scenario for sovereigns after currency
fragmentation would be pegging to stronger currencies among them the euro, along with the de
jure full conversion of euro denominated debt into foreign debt. Pegging to a foreign currency is
often times not a sovereign decision at all, but rather an imposed constraint in a strategy to
attract foreign direct investment38. Hence, peripheral members would most likely fall deeper into
export-led development strategies in the context of deteriorating terms of trade. However, and
leaving aside for a moment whether there is space for new exports in a world where incumbents
dominate established export markets, the increasing nature of industrial assembly is that of
increasing integration of value chains (Kregel 2019). Hence, the import content of finished
exports can greatly reduce the actual effect of a persistently undervalued currency or a one-off
devaluation (Toporowski 2013).
Arguably, during the interwar period, when commercial bilateral blocs formed due to the failure
to find a suitable substitute for the Gold Standard, the economic sovereignty of certain
peripheral countries strengthened to the extent they had more freedom from international
pressures to play by the deflationary rules of the game. During this period, countries were
pushed to partially delink from the international financial system and pursue policies that
reestablished a minimum level of domestic demand to counter the collapse of international trade
in large part due to the failure of the system, the liberal Gold Standard, obstinate in enforcing
non-viable economic austerity (Toniolo 2005). The Soviet Union, long marginalized from the
international financial system by then, was itself pursuing the domestic route to bring its
economy into industrial maturity (Rostow). Ramping up military production was, like with others,
one of the main ways to achieve the goal. Though full employment or approximations to full
employment were achieved in blocs of countries turning their backs to the international financial
system years before the Keynesian era, Keynes realized that the autarkic rout had carried the
threat of military conflict between core capitalist states (Skidelsky 2000). Cooperation on the
other hand, could lead to better outcomes. However, the economic hegemon had to lead by
becoming the consumer market of choice for exporters and the engine of international demand.
The plan for the clearing union was undoubtedly setup by Keynes, the loyal servant of the
crown, to support his nation after the demise of the empire. He was well aware that clause VII of
Lend-Lease implied Great Britain would no longer lead the commonwealth nations and all other
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One can confidently state that outside the EZ, after default, the exiting nation would come under the control of
ruthless multinational agencies as the history of debt restructuring processes has proven time and time again.
38
The reason most countries with weaker currencies peg to a stronger currency is to promote external
competitiveness (to counter Dutch disease), reduce currency risk for investors, and to keep domestic purchasing
power in check. Exiting the euro would thrust nations back into abiding by all three considerations.
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countries formerly tied to sterling. Naturally, this implied Great Britain could scarcely expect to
have its negative external trade balance compensated by its old allies and client states, as had
been the case. Great Britain would have to play by the new rules made in the interest of the true
winner of both world wars, the United States, and its pursuit of multilateralism. It would have to
compete with other core industrial nations in a more level playing field. Even its role as financial
entrepôt –perhaps nowhere else was it easier to raise capital for different international ventures
(Burn 1999)— was eventually surpassed, though much less so than the loss of its currency
share in total official reserve assets would suggest .
Writing in this particular historic setting, Keynes did not explicitly take into account the needs of
peripheral countries and the effect this would have on the stability of the international financial
framework. His overriding priority was avoiding the zero sum game in trade between world
economic powers, a concern shared by the US. In a response to a critic of his international
currency proposal for the Bretton Woods negotiations, Keynes explicitly stated “[t]he Currency
Plan aims at providing reserves to tide over short-term fluctuations[,] an orderly method for
altering exchange rates when necessary, and for ensuring multilateral clearing of current trade
transactions” (Chandavarkar 1987, 140). In other words, his was not a framework with the
immediate aim and ambition to support ‘convergence’, or to promote new industrializers. As the
financial crisis in the EZ has shown, the convergence39 or catching up aspect was also not
prioritized in the institutional design of the EZ, to the detriment of the region as a whole.
As history has shown, if a country, currency union, or financial system does not address the
long term lenders situation, as occurred in the Bretton Woods system, the economy itself risks
major turmoil. The financial sectors of developed countries typically step up to fill the void of
long-term credit to perennial debtors --in essence all convergence countries are structural
debtors. The latter then become unstable when investors finally realize the Ponzi nature of the
capital flows to debtors (Kregel 2004, 2006). The EZ, for its part, much more so than the Keynes
Plan, was conceived mainly as a financial scheme to promote trade among the core powers,
with the fundamental difference that the Keynes Plan was envisioned as a full employment and
growth biased scheme contrary to the oligarchic deflationary bias of the EZ, whose main
actionable agency pursues price stability --i.e., the disciplining the workforce at every
opportunity (crisis) that arises.
A further limitation of the Keynes Plan relevant to the EZ situation today was its focus on a ‘hard
law’ program, especially so in the first drafts (Skidelsky 2000). The intention to put into writing a
series of binding regulations that would compel the US to recycle (or relinquish) their gold
surpluses were struck down during negotiations with the US’s Treasury representative, Harry
Dexter White. Scholars studying the negotiations in detail acknowledged that the only hard law
ordinance making it into writing and embodying the intention to counter the long-term
accumulation of trade surpluses was the scarce currency clause, a dead letter according to
experts (Skidelsky ‘Resurrecting Creditor Adjustment’, Chandavarkar). The cited clause would
39

Historically, convergence has been at the root of development theory ever since the Mercantilist era, and has been
crucially important for countries with an established agricultural sector needing an expansion into manufacturing to
dispense with agricultural surpluses (List 2017, 75-6)
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presumably enable deficit countries to discriminate against goods from surplus nations that
made no effort at promoting a reflux of their currency to nations they were, nonetheless, content
to trade with. The attempt by Keynes to establish a ‘hard law’ regulatory framework for a
multilateral institution that would contribute to overcoming European proclivity toward extreme
forms of mercantilism –originally espoused as a reaction to cosmopolitan free-trade British
policies— was undoubtedly a noble purpose. However, it required US deference to a leadingby-growing strategy that never fully materialized in the form Keynes thought best --in the form of
a supranational organization binding the main creditor nation to recycle its surpluses.
Nevertheless, once its geopolitical interests were weighed against its creditor interests, the US
eventually become aware that it would have to establish clear currency reflux mechanisms in
order to prevent another retrenchment into autarky in Europe (Davidson 1985, Ramirez
Cisneros 2018).
Be it a strategy for negotiation or perhaps real reluctance by the new world superpower, the
United States, to enter into binding international treaties, it became clear that even amongst
wartime allies, the way to achieve a harmonization of economic policy within a shared
ideological framework would be negotiations and diplomacy leading towards cooperation --not
‘hard law’ obligations. In the end, the US would go to great lengths to guarantee its currency
would not become scarce (Davidson 1985, Minsky 1986, Ramirez Cisneros 2018). This was
especially so in regards to its support of strategic partners in Western Europe and Asia, to
whom funds were distributed by aid and later, were the beneficiaries of strong commercial ties.
Regarding the EZ, ‘hard law’ has the benefit of enshrining rules to the effect that not even the
regional hegemon could escape adherence. However, for this very reason, it is difficult to gain
the approval of all parties, especially surplus nations, and may take years to achieve. In the
meantime, ad hoc measures and collaboration between constituents must ensure nation-states
can perform their implicit bargain. A failed customs and currency union is the alternative, instead
of charting a potentially unparalleled prosperous regional market.
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